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1  Introduction
How are agents made? Which psychological components, assem-
bled with which structure, do we need to engineer a system that acts 
for reasons, rather than one that is merely shunted around by external 
forces? One kind of answer to these questions, associated with G. E. 
M. Anscombe (1957), identifies the crucial ingredient as epistemic—
the qualitative difference between agents and mere movers or behavers 
depends on a distinctive kind of knowledge that agents have of their 
own actions. As an agent, your knowledge of mere happenings (like your 
stomach involuntarily rumbling) is observational, whereas your knowl-
edge of your voluntary actions (like your going to the kitchen to make 
a snack) is non-observational—you have practical knowledge of your 
own activity through your very act of carrying it out. Let’s assume this 
framework for now (we’ll work through arguments in its favour below). 
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How should the kind of practical knowledge distinctive of agency be 
analysed? In particular, what role if any do emotions play in enabling 
knowledge of this kind?
Over the past 30 years, J. David Velleman (1989, 2006a, 2009, 2014) 
has developed a sophisticated view of practical rationality which aims to 
address these questions. For reasons we’ll set out below, he argues that 
the kind of practical rationality distinctive of agency depends on the 
motivational force of a drive towards self-consistency. To be an agent 
is to be a system that is driven to act in ways that make sense to one-
self. Articulating the nature and operations of this drive towards self- 
consistency thus becomes the key task for a theory of human agency 
and practical reason. The main question with which this chapter is con-
cerned is: What role do emotions play in structuring such a drive and its 
operations? As we will see, there are two interpretations of the nature of 
the drive towards self-consistency in Velleman’s work, not always hap-
pily related. Agents might aim towards self-consistency by striving to 
act in ways that make causal-psychological sense—roughly, by acting 
in ways that maximize the coherence of their beliefs, desires, plans and 
other psychological states. Or they might aim towards self-consistency 
by striving to act in ways that make narrative sense—acting in ways 
that make their lives conform to the beats of familiar story structures. 
Velleman provides compelling reasons to think that emotions are impli-
cated in narrative sense-making—the beats of familiar story structures 
are felt rather than thought through, so agency can consist in shaping 
your life in order to feel a particular way about it. How are causal- 
psychological consistency and narrative consistency related? As we’ll 
see below, Velleman initially thought of the latter as an appealing way 
of redescribing the former, but later came to argue that each kind of 
consistency conveyed a fundamentally different kind of understand-
ing. I will agree with Velleman that causal-psychological and narrative 
understanding are distinct, but argue that Velleman’s view of their rela-
tions is unsatisfactory. Velleman comes to prioritize causal-psychological 
over narrative self-understanding in a way that jeopardizes the natural-
istic credentials of his framework and undermines his claim that a drive 
towards narrative coherence can constitute a legitimate source of prac-
tical rationality. The positive suggestion this chapter aims to motivate 
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is that the problems facing Velleman’s view can be overcome by revers-
ing his order of dependence between causal-psychological and narrative 
self-consistency—instead of viewing narrative self-understanding as a 
sophisticated achievement resting on folk-psychological self-understanding, 
we should understand our drive towards rational self-consistency—and 
thus our status as agents—as resting on an emotionally structured bed-
rock of narrative competences.
2  Narrativity and Normativity
In ‘The Self as Narrator’, Velleman (2005) proposes a connection 
between narrativity and a kind of normativity which he thinks is dis-
tinctive of practical rationality. A self-narrating system—one that issues 
a running commentary on its own activities—comes to exhibit a form 
of practical rationality when its past self-narrations constrain its present 
action selection in a particular way. This is the sort of constraint that 
happens when, weighing up whether to go for a run or to the pub, I 
remember saying to myself that morning that I was turning over a new 
leaf—one involving less pub-going and more running—and factor that 
into my decision. A bit of self-narration from my past has come back to 
haunt my present deliberation.
Velleman’s guiding example, adapted from Dennett’s (1991) reflec-
tions on the links between selfhood and narrativity, concerns Gilbert, 
an intelligent robot that churns out a running commentary on his activ-
ities as he goes about his business. Dennett (op. cit., 1991; Dennett 
and Humphrey 1998) thinks that such epiphenomenal, stream- 
of-consciousness self-narration is all there is to selfhood. Consequently, 
Dennett holds that we should understand the self—both in Gilbert’s 
case and our own—as a narrative fiction. The self is just the protagonist 
described or implied by the epiphenomenal tale spun by a  self-narrating 
system. But this protagonist is fictional. When we look beyond or 
behind the narrative, Dennett argues, we will find nothing but a patch-
work of special purpose subsystems, cleverly stitched together to issue in 
behaviour and self-report that gives the illusory appearance of a unified 
‘self ’ working behind the scenes.
148     D. Ward
In response, Velleman points out that self-narration need not be 
epiphenomenal. There are cases, including our own, where ‘an autobi-
ography and the behaviour that it narrates are mutually determining’ 
(Velleman 2005, p. 211), such that a narrative produced at one time 
can have repercussions for subsequent deliberation and action selec-
tion. The narrative Gilbert produced about his activities in the morning 
might shape his action selection in the evening. If Gilbert self-narrates 
that he will soon go into the supply closet for fresh batteries, the mem-
ory of this proclamation might tip the balance in a subsequent compe-
tition between closet-going and energy-conserving subroutines vying for 
control of Gilbert’s behaviour. In the same way, my morning proclama-
tion that I am now more of a runner than a pub-goer can help deter-
mine my behaviour in the evening. According to Velleman, this kind 
of system or creature—one that is driven to shape its current action 
selection to cohere with its past acts of narration—is a genuine agent. 
And this specifies a sense in which such a system or creature has, or is, 
a self—as we will see below, Velleman argues that some of their behav-
iours qualify as exercises of agency by being genuinely autonomous or 
self-governed.
One intuitive way of differentiating actions from mere happenings 
is via appeal to the distinctive way in which the past shapes the pres-
ent and the future in exercises of agency. Every happening in the uni-
verse unfolds according to causal laws, whereby the past and present 
shape the future. But some happenings are also acts, in which an agent 
can properly be held responsible for the way things unfold. In cases of 
agency the past and present shape the future not only via causal laws, 
but also by furnishing an agent with reasons to act in one way rather 
than another.1 Velleman’s suggestion is that we can often understand 
these reasons in terms of the way in which potential states of an agent’s 
future stand in relations of narrative coherence to states of their past. 
When weighing up whether to run or to pub, my deliberation is shaped 
1On Velleman’s understanding this way of drawing the act/happening distinction coincides with 
Anscombe’s epistemic strategy as outlined in the introduction. As we will see, for Velleman the 
reason-governed way in which the past shapes the future in agency is a function of the distinctive 
epistemic relation in which an agent stands to her acts.
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not only by causal processes determining my current levels of thirst and 
fatigue, but also by the fact that I told myself this morning that I was 
now the sort of person who goes for a run more often than they go to 
the pub. Choosing the pub over the run would mess up the coherence 
of this self-conception. According to Velleman, the fact that these con-
siderations of coherence are in play in motivating my choices can mark 
me out as an agent who is responsive to reasons, rather than a mere lump 
of organic matter, shunted around by external forces.
What exactly, you might be wondering, is narrative coherence? 
More on this soon. For now, note that feeling the motivational sway 
of considerations of narrative coherence is, for Velleman, sufficient 
but perhaps not necessary to qualify as an agent. This is because his 
earlier work argues, persuasively and influentially, for understanding 
agency in terms of susceptibility to the motivational sway of consid-
erations of causal-psychological coherence—roughly, being motivated 
to act in a rationally coherent way. We will look at this view in a little 
more detail below. For now, the basic idea is that someone motivated 
by a drive towards causal/psychological coherence is thereby disposed to 
avoid acting in ways that are inconsistent with their plans, projects and 
self-conception, and to ensure that the motives that drive their eventual 
action are those that they, as a rational agent, have the strongest reasons 
to endorse.2 It thus appears, on Velleman’s picture, that there are two 
ways in which a system can qualify as autonomous, and thereby as an 
agent. Agents can be motivated by a drive towards narrative coherence, 
as when they try to act so as to make a coherent story out of the unfold-
ing events of their lives. Or they can be motivated by a drive towards 
causal-psychological coherence, as when they try to maximize the 
rational consistency of their current activity with their plans, projects 
and self-conceptions. How are these two ways related to each other? 
On the face of it, Gilbert’s declaration that he’s about to go into the 
closet, and my declaration that I will err towards running over pubbing, 
could be understood as constraining our respective futures via a drive 
towards either kind of coherence. Indeed, Velleman initially supposed 
2See e.g. Velleman (2006b, 2009, 2014).
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that narrative coherence was simply an appealing way of redescribing 
causal-psychological coherence:
My hope was that narrative self-understanding would be less objection-
able to those who had previously criticized my view of autonomy as 
overly intellectualist, because it requires the agent to psychologize about 
himself. Nobody wants to think that he is studying himself like a rat in 
a maze; but everybody likes to think of himself as the novelist of his life 
and hence as the protagonist of his own story. (2007, p. 284)
We all know, however, that great stories can contain gaps and incon-
sistencies. And any student of philosophy knows that great reason-
ing doesn’t always make for great reading. Velleman thus rightly came 
to think that narrative coherence is distinct from  causal-psychological 
coherence, and that the pursuit of each kind of coherence involves 
striving to confer a distinct kind of intelligibility on ourselves and our 
activities—more on which below. This complicates Velleman’s view of 
the kind of practical rationality that is constitutive of agency:
The upshot is that practical reasoning is fragmented into the pursuit of 
two distinct modes of self-understanding. I think that we aim to make 
sense of ourselves not only in the mode of causal explanation but also in 
the mode of storytelling. (ibid., p. 285)
How do these two modes of self-understanding relate to each other? 
And what, a reader of this volume might be wondering, does either of 
them have to do with emotions? While our ultimate goal is to make 
progress on the first question, the second question is easier—so let’s 
start there.
3  Understanding via Emotional Cadence
As noted above, Velleman initially thought of narrative self-understanding  
simply as a folksy way of describing the causal-psychological self- 
understanding he thought was constitutively involved in practical 
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rationality. As we also noted, however, the virtue of sheer rational coher-
ence looks different from the virtue of being a good story. Velleman 
(2003) argues that this is because stories convey understanding in way 
that is different from a mere description of causally connected events, 
and do so because they arouse and complete an emotional cadence. A 
description of a sequence of causally connected events becomes a story 
when it has a beginning, middle and end, with each of these stages 
understood in terms of their emotional structure. A story’s beginning 
arouses an emotional reaction, which is developed or complicated by its 
middle, and resolved by its end. It thus conveys an understanding of its 
events by bringing its audience to feel a particular way about them:
the emotion that resolves a narrative cadence tends to subsume the emo-
tions that preceded it: the triumph felt at a happy ending is the triumph 
of ambitions realized and anxieties allayed; the grief felt at a tragic end-
ing is the grief of hopes dashed or loves denied. Hence the conclusory 
emotion in a narrative cadence embodies not just how the audience feels 
about the ending; it embodies how the audience feels, at the ending, 
about the whole story. (ibid., p. 19)
A happy ending can help the audience to view the protagonist’s trials 
and tribulations as character-building episodes on the road to her inev-
itable triumph; a tragic ending can help the audience to view the same 
struggles as hopeless attempts to delay a foregone conclusion. Emotions 
thus impart narrative understanding by shaping the audience’s experi-
ence of events as they unfold, and by imposing a stable and coherent 
interpretation of events via the anticipation or undergoing of a conclud-
ing emotion that provides a unified perspective on the story’s contents.
This view of narrative understanding relies on a pair of relatively 
uncontroversial claims about emotion that I will assume to be correct. 
The first is that emotions have an intentional component—they involve 
a way of being directed towards specific objects, or towards the world 
at large (see e.g. Lazarus 1991; Goldie 2000; Prinz 2004; Slaby 2008). 
This is one reason why the emotional character of stories imparts under-
standing—feeling emotions involves having our minds preferentially 
directed to particular aspects of situations and events. The second claim 
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is that at least some emotions (those implicated in narrative understand-
ing) have an essentially diachronic and relational character (see e.g. 
Lewis 2005; Goldie 2012; Barrett 2017). That is, they are partly defined 
by the ways in which they unfold over time and relate to situations, 
behaviour, and other emotional states:
Fear and anger, for example, can be elicited out of the blue… whereas 
disappointment, gratification and grief must develop out of some ante-
cedent attitude that can be disappointed, gratified, or aggrieved… 
Emotions like hope, fear, and anger are by nature unstable, because they 
motivate behavior, or are elicited by circumstances, that ultimately lead to 
their extinction… By contrast, grief and gratification are stable, because 
their eliciting conditions and resulting behaviors are not conducive to 
change. (ibid., p. 15)
As a result, the emotional cadences that are constitutive of narrative 
understanding have important constraints on how they can and can-
not unfold. Not just any patchwork of affective responses will do—the 
concluding emotion must be one that is capable both of evolving out 
of and resolving the range of emotions engendered by the story, and of 
providing a coherent perspective on the story’s situations and events. 
We exercise narrative understanding when our grasp of the elements of 
a situation or sequence of events is shaped by an emotional cadence—
either via occupying a stable emotional state contributing to a perspec-
tive which makes sense of a prior sequence of events or feelings, or 
anticipating how unfolding events and feelings will resolve into such a 
perspective.
Velleman (2003, 2009) has much of interest to say about how this 
view relates to theories of literary narrative, and the particular cadences 
distinctive of various literary and dramatic genres. Our focus here, 
though, is on Velleman’s claim that we usually understand ourselves in 
narrative terms. This amounts to the claim that we are motivated to 
grasp the activities and episodes that make up our lives in terms of the 
kinds of familiar emotional cadences that we use to understand stories. 
In arguing that there is a narrative component to our self-understanding, 
Velleman is claiming that in making sense of our lives we look for 
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the kinds of emotional linkages and resolutions that are at work in 
successfully making sense of a story. To illustrate, consider the ways in 
which many puzzling patterns of apparent practical irrationality can be 
explained by distinguishing between these modes of self-understanding. 
Velleman suggests, for example, that we can account for the ‘sunk cost’ 
fallacy—‘in vernacular terms, throwing good money after bad’ (2007, 
p. 285), in terms of our propensity to seek emotionally meaningful 
payoffs to our projects and commitments:
As any A.B.D. student knows, an endeavor abandoned in mid-course 
yields no emotional resolution, not even the resolution of disappoint-
ment. Continually abandoning one relationship or project for another 
would leave us not knowing (as we might say) what some parts of our 
lives had been about. And to know what parts of our lives have been 
‘about’ is just to know how they fit into a story with an emotionally intel-
ligible arc. (ibid., p. 286)
Likewise, Velleman suggests, our propensity to see misfortune as some-
thing that can be learned from can be understood in terms of a drive 
towards narrative self-understanding:
If life hands you a lemon, the instrumentally rational course may be 
to throw it away and look for a kumquat instead. Why feel obliged to 
make something out of a lemon just because you’ve been handed one? 
The answer is that a misfortune can be given meaning by a narrative that 
incorporates it into the remainder of your life, during which its bitterness 
is still detectable but somehow sweetened. (ibid.)
In each of the above cases, an apparent failure of practical rationality is 
explained by supposing that our choices aim at an outcome that com-
pletes a familiar emotional cadence, thereby providing a perspective 
according to which prior events are rendered intelligible in terms of 
their place in a narrative structure. If our overriding practical interest 
were in totting up utility points then ditching a failing relationship or 
research project might often be our best option. But if we have a prac-
tical interest in attaining a kind of self-understanding that involves 
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threading the events of our lives into a unified narrative, then the time 
and suffering costs incurred by persevering needn’t put us off. For if we 
can successfully fight our way to feeling good about our relationship or 
research, this affords us a perspective from which the struggles along the 
road are revealed as necessary landmarks or obstacles in the journey of 
our life. This is the sort of story we all know and understand, even if its 
instances don’t always make strict logical sense.
Let me note a final point in favour of Velleman’s view of the role of 
narrative understanding in our lives. Velleman’s reflections on the narra-
tive structure of practical reason can be placed within a long tradition of 
arguing that important aspects of our selfhood, or self-understanding, 
must be accounted for via appeal to narrativity (MacIntyre 1981; 
Taylor 1985; Schechtman 1996; Korsgaard 2009; Rudd 2012). As 
Jongepier (2016) notes, however, narrative accounts of selfhood face 
a dilemma—they appear to be caught between chauvinism on the one 
hand, and triviality on the other hand. The claim that humans necessar-
ily understand their lives as a story courts accusations of chauvinism— 
critics of narrative accounts argue that other ways of living and 
understanding one’s life are available, and that these may be more psy-
chologically or morally healthy (Strawson 2004; Lamarque 2007). 
Galen Strawson, for example, claims ‘I have no sense of my life as a 
narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely 
none’ (2004, p. 433). Given the apparent existence of such non- 
narrative psychologies, Strawson and others argue that claims that people 
do or should understand their lives as they would understand a story 
‘are not universal human truths… Their proponents, the narrativists, 
are at best generalizing from their experience in an all-too-human way’ 
(Strawson 2017, p. 124). In light of such accusations of chauvinism, a 
natural response is to claim that narrative self-understanding need only 
be implicit—somehow evinced in the structure of our lives or psychol-
ogy, rather than being a self-consciously held schema for making sense 
of ourselves (e.g. Stokes 2010; Davenport 2012; Schechtman 2014). 
However, such accounts face the challenge of spelling out a  non-trivial 
sense of narrativity that nonetheless accommodates the sincere reports 
of those who find no trace of a story-like structure in their self- 
understandings. If the narrative structure of Strawson’s self-understanding  
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is buried so deeply that he can’t find it within himself in almost 20 years 
of trying (Strawson 1999, 2017), why suppose it’s there at all?
Velleman’s account simultaneously avoids the charges of chauvinism 
and triviality. Conceiving of narrative understanding in terms of grasp-
ing emotional cadences suggests how someone might exercise practical 
rationality in a way that aims at narrative coherence, but do so with-
out having an explicit sense of their life as a continuous unfolding story. 
If Velleman is right then the question raised by those, like Strawson, 
who find a narrative self-conception implausible is whether their prac-
tical reasoning is often or always motivated by a drive to resolve an 
emotional cadence. We might be convinced by Velleman’s substantive 
arguments that such drives play an important role in an agent’s psychol-
ogy while denying that this fact must be introspectively obvious to us. 
The claim that the involvement of emotional cadences is what distin-
guishes narrative understanding from mere causal-nomological under-
standing has likewise required substantive argument. Velleman’s claim 
that human agency involves narrative understanding in the form of a 
drive to act in ways that resolve emotional cadences is thus non-trivial. 
It is non-chauvinist insofar as it is compatible with granting full human 
agency to those who have simply failed to notice this structure in their 
own psychology, so long as that structure does in fact obtain. Velleman’s 
view does imply, however, that the absence of this narrative strand of 
practical rationality constitutes a defect:
[C]aring about narrative coherence is part of human rationality. Someone 
who manages his life as he would a stock portfolio is not just unsentimen-
tal; he’s lacking in a virtue of practical reason that’s available to human 
beings, who can understand their lives in both causal-psychological and 
narrative terms. (2007, p. 286)
But this position rests on more than the hasty extrapolation from quirks 
of individual psychology which grounds Strawson’s accusations of ‘chau-
vinism’. If Strawson or a kindred spirit finds no trace of a drive towards 
narrative coherence in their psychology, the burden of proof now 
appears to rest with them—they must explain away the appearance that 
there is something deficient, with respect to the virtues that characterize 
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human practical rationality, in managing the projects and commitments 
of one’s life like a stock portfolio.3
So the sincere self-reports of Strawson and his ilk need not count 
against Velleman’s claims about the role of narrative understanding in 
our lives. Moreover, as we have begun to see above, and will now con-
sider further, Velleman argues persuasively that such understanding 
plays a crucial role in a form of autonomous agency that is plausibly a 
constitutive aspect of human personhood.4
* * *
So far I have mostly been approvingly summarizing some lines of 
Velleman’s thinking about practical rationality. In a moment I want 
to begin make some trouble for him. Recall that Velleman originally 
began appealing to narrative self-understanding as a homely redescrip-
tion of the causal-psychological self-understanding he argued elsewhere 
was a constitutive motive of practical rationality. But, as we saw in the 
last section, there are good reasons to think that understanding events, 
including the unfolding events of our lives, in narrative terms is distinct 
from understanding them in terms of mere causal and rational con-
sistency. Velleman thus comes to think that the psychology of human 
agents is fractured into two ‘independent and potentially competing 
modes of practical reasoning’ (2007, p. 287), aimed at two distinct 
modes of self-understanding. In itself, there’s nothing wrong with this. 
Perhaps it’s not nice to be told that we have a fractured psychology, 
but sometimes the truth hurts. And given the widespread appearance 
4The degree of compatibility between Velleman’s views on practical rationality and selfhood and 
the narrative theories cited above is a delicate issue. A key tenet of Velleman’s work on person-
hood is that ‘self ’ is a multi-purpose reflective pronoun, rather than the designator of a single 
entity or topic of enquiry (Velleman 2006a). In this chapter our concern is with the mode of 
reflexive self-understanding that Velleman argues is constitutive of agency. But Velleman is at best 
agnostic about the relationship between the self-understanding constitutive of agency (under-
stood, roughly, in terms of a drive to act in ways that make sense to ourselves) and the kinds of 
self-conception with which narrative theorists are frequently concerned (e.g. conceiving of oneself 
as a loving spouse, committed parent, or hopeless loser). See e.g. Velleman (2001a, 2007, 2009).
3Velleman (2009) appears to have changed his mind on this score, claiming that the drive towards 
narrative self-understanding is an optional supplement to the drive towards causal-psychological 
self-understanding for practical reasoners, ‘at least to some extent’ (p. 204). Below I argue that 
this is a mistake—it is more plausible to construe causal-psychological understanding as built on 
a foundation of narrative understanding.
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of practical irrationality, perhaps the diagnosis of a fracture should not 
surprise us.
However, the admission that we’re dealing with two modes of prac-
tical rationality rather than one appears to undermine some important 
aspects of Velleman’s view. First, once it becomes clear that narrative self- 
understanding is distinct from causal-psychological self-understanding, 
the appeal to narrative self-understanding can’t serve its original purpose of 
assuaging the worries of critics who accuse Velleman’s causal-psychological 
account of practical reasoning of an implausible intellectualism. Second, 
given that narrative self-understanding was initially supposed to be equiv-
alent to causal-psychological self-understanding it could borrow its plau-
sibility as a source of practical rationality from Velleman’s earlier work on 
the role of causal-psychological self-understanding in practical rationality. 
Now that we’ve denied the equivalence of these modes of self-understand-
ing, that borrowed plausibility must be returned and narrative self-under-
standing must pay its own way as a legitimate source of practical reason. 
Can it do so? Not, I will argue, unless we understand causal-psychological 
understanding as build upon a bedrock of narrative self-understanding. 
Narrative understanding, it will emerge, should be seen as essential to prac-
tical rationality, and the regular cadences that pattern the ebb and flow of 
our emotional lives are essential to narrative understanding. To see why this 
is so, however, we first need to know a little more about the motivations for 
Velleman’s causal-psychological view.
4  Three Ways to Build an Agent
Consider (following Velleman 2001b) three ways in which we might go 
about building an agent. Let’s give ourselves a head start by beginning 
with a creature that is a bundle of competing drives or motivations. 
How should we modify such a creature to make it capable of agency like 
our own? One simple strategy is suggested by Donald Davidson’s (1963, 
1980) influential causal theory of action—for a happening to qualify as 
an action, it is necessary and sufficient that it be caused in an appropri-
ate way by an intention to act. Your reading these words is an exercise 
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of your agency because it is a happening caused by your intentions. 
Your yawning, rumbling stomach, or sagging eyelids are not exercises 
of agency because they are not so caused. To build an agent, then, per-
haps we need only to take a creature that can have intentions and move 
around, and ensure it is wired up such that some of its movements will 
be appropriately caused by its intentions. Those movements will qualify 
as actions.
But note the looming difficulties of spelling out what it is for an 
action to be appropriately caused by an intention. Harry Frankfurt 
(1975, 1988) points out that our activities can be caused by our desires 
and intentions without our feeling that those activities are expressive of 
our will—we can be alienated from some of the forces that motivate us. 
This morning I desired to hit the snooze button on my alarm for a third 
time and formed a corresponding intention that caused me to do so. 
But my desire for a third snooze was competing with other, worthier 
desires: to get up, go for a run, get working and generally achieve great 
things. As often happens, the desire to snooze won out. But its winning 
out was, so it seems, an imperfect reflection of my will and agency—
if I had been allowed to pick the winning desire, I would have gone 
with ‘achieve great things’. Even if we don’t wish to say that agency was 
wholly absent in my snooze-button pressing, it looks like a poor par-
adigm case for understanding what’s distinctive about human action. 
In fleshing out what it is for an action to be ‘appropriately caused’ by 
an intention, our blueprint for designing an agent should allow for the 
distinction between akratic actions like my snooze-button pressing and 
those that are more authentic expressions of the agent’s will. Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical model of agency tries to do this by appealing to higher- 
order desires or volitions. This morning my first-order desire to snooze 
trumped its worthier competitors. But it was at best a partial exercise 
of agency, since I had a second-order desire that my first-order desire to 
get up and achieve great things should win out. On Frankfurt’s hier-
archical model, the happenings that are paradigmatic exercises of 
agency are those caused by a first-order desire that the agent identifies 
with via having a second-order desire to be actuated by it. Our sec-
ond agent-building strategy, then, involves adding a layer of second- 
order volitional states to our creature’s psychology which can harmonize 
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(or clash) with the first-order states that actuate its behaviour. When 
such harmony obtains, we have an exercise of agency.
This looks better—but if we were dissatisfied with our first strat-
egy, we shouldn’t accept our second as it is. We objected to Davidson’s 
causal model by noting that we can feel alienated from the intentions 
that end up moving us—we do not recognize them as authentic expres-
sions of our wills. Velleman (1992, 2001a, drawing on Watson [1982] 
and Bratman [1999]) notes that we can likewise feel alienated from our 
second-order desires or identifications. I might find myself—in fact, 
most mornings do find myself—giving a second-order endorsement to 
a first-order desire for further snoozing that I find mildly shameful. It 
appears that some second-order endorsements of first-order desires can 
reflect an agent’s will better than others. A second-order endorsement 
might be a product of ennui, depression, inebriation or mind-control. 
An account of agency should try to accommodate a sense in which the 
behaviours flowing from such endorsements are imperfect exercises 
of agency. Simply appealing to higher levels of reflective endorsement 
won’t help, unless we are given a reason why the endorsements at some 
particular level can’t be produced in the defective ways suggested above. 
We need, it seems, an account of what it is for an agent to identify with 
an actuating desire, as opposed to that identification being something 
that simply befalls them.
This leads to our third strategy for agent-building—Velleman’s own. 
Velleman traces the failures of our first two strategies to the appear-
ance that the psychological dynamics they suggested as constitutive 
of agency can obtain without the agent being suitably involved. The 
Davidsonian account understands agency as the government of your 
movements by intentions—but what if those intentions aren’t the ones 
that you, the agent, want to be governed by? The Frankfurtian account 
understands agency as movements that are governed by intentions 
which have received higher-order endorsement—but what if those 
endorsements are not ones that you, the agent, recognize as expressive 
of your will? Velleman’s strategy is to specify the psychological dynam-
ics of a kind of motivated activity that cannot, by definition, unfold 
independently of the agent’s involvement. Such dynamics would need 
to encompass whatever state, process, or organization, we thought 
160     D. Ward
constituted agency. So what does constitute agency? Our objections to 
the previous agent-building strategies have relied on understanding the 
agent as capable of standing back and surveying possible determinants 
of behaviour (intentions, motives, higher-order volitions), and taking 
a stance on which should prevail. This surveying and stance-taking, 
thinks Velleman, is simply the functional role of an agent: ‘that of a 
single party prepared to reflect on, and take sides with, potential deter-
minants of behavior at any level in the hierarchy of attitudes’ (1992, 
p. 19). Given this functional characterization of agency, we can’t iden-
tify behaviour-governing intentions or second-order desires with the 
agent, since these are aspects of the agent’s psychology which the agent 
can scrutinize and take a stance on. So, what plays the role of the agent?
What mental event or state might play this role of always directing and 
never merely undergoing such scrutiny? It can only be a motive that 
drives practical thought itself. That is, there must be a motive that drives 
the agent’s critical reflection on, and endorsement or rejection of, the 
potential determinants of his behavior, always doing so from a position 
of independence from the objects of review. Only such a motive would 
occupy the agent’s functional role, and only its contribution to behavior 
would constitute his own contribution. (Velleman 1992, p. 119)
Velleman argues that the motivation constitutive of agency is a drive to 
act in accordance with reasons (to ‘act reasonably’ for short).5 You can 
stand back from your desires and critically reflect on them; you can also 
stand back from this process of critical reflection and reflect on whether 
you agree with its procedure or results. But you, as an agent, cannot 
disassociate yourself from the drive to act reasonably that informs the 
results of any such standing back. Suppose that, in your practical delib-
eration, you find yourself reflecting on your drive to act reasonably, and 
somehow decide that it is a bad thing—starting from now, you will no 
longer allow the drive to act reasonably to motivate you. This resolution 
5Note that an agent might be motivated by this drive without having the concept of acting for 
reasons. It suffices that the drive in fact propels the agent to act reasonably, whether or not the 
agent understands themselves in these terms (Velleman 1992, pp. 120–121; 2001b, pp. 26–32).
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is impossible to put into practice. In trying not to be motivated by the 
drive to act reasonably you will be trying to do what you judge your-
self to have best reason to do—you will be trying to act reasonably, 
and your attempt will have been self-undermining. Suppose instead, 
then, that you arrange to have yourself undergo targeted brain damage, 
removing only your drive to act reasonably. Would you have succeeded 
in your resolution? It seems not—you, the agent that made the resolu-
tion, are no longer around to have your actions be motivated, or fail to 
be motivated, by any drive. In your place is a creature who can still step 
back, survey the various potential determinants of its behaviour, and 
ponder what it would be most appropriate to do in light of this survey. 
But the results of this deliberation need bear no systematic relation to 
what the creature goes on to do, lacking as it does the drive to act rea-
sonably. What this creature goes on to do is, in the sense relevant for 
agency, no longer under its control—however its competing drives and 
impulses are channelled into a single coherent course of action, we have 
no reason to think that this channelling is a product of an aspect of its 
psychology with which we can identify the creature qua agent. In giving 
up your drive to act in accordance with reasons you gave up the motive 
in virtue of which your activity could intelligibly be traced back to you 
as an agent.
On Velleman’s model, then, adding the motivational force of the 
drive to act reasonably to one among the agent’s competing motives 
ensures that the resulting behaviour constitutes an exercise of agency:
[W]hen a desire appears to provide the strongest reason for acting, then 
the desire to act in accordance with reasons becomes a motive to act on 
that desire, and the desire’s motivational influence is consequently rein-
forced… This latter contribution to the agent’s behavior is the contribu-
tion of an attitude that performs the functions definitive of agency; it is 
therefore, functionally speaking, the agent’s contribution to the causal 
order. (1992, p. 121)
In place of a Frankfurtian higher-order endorsement, it is the addi-
tion of the motivational force of the drive to act reasonably to one of 
your other motivations that constitutes your ‘identifying’ with it—in 
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the sense of its belonging to you as an agent. We now have our third 
and final blueprint for building an agent. We began with a bundle of 
competing drives and motives and, following Davidson, hooked things 
up such that our creature’s intentions can function as the causes of its 
behaviour. Following Frankfurt, we then added a capacity for the crea-
ture to step back and survey the potential psychological determinants 
of its behaviour, and give or withhold its endorsement of them. Finally, 
following Velleman, we added the background drive to act reasonably. 
This drive can now determine how exercises of the capacity to step back 
and survey are translated into behaviour, by joining its motivational 
force with that of the course of action that best accords with its aims. 
My evening decision to eschew the pub and go for a run, and Gilbert’s 
decision to head to the closet for fresh batteries are, for Velleman, exer-
cises of agency because our prior resolutions are modulating the compe-
tition between our present motives in a way that is guided by a drive to 
act reasonably that is a constitutive requirement of agency.
5  Two Sources of Practical Reason
The above sketch of Velleman’s interrelated conceptions of agency and 
practical reason brings some problems for his account of the relationship 
between causal-psychological and narrative self-understanding into view. 
We have already noted that Velleman revised his earlier view that nar-
rative understanding was a homely redescription of causal- psychological 
understanding, now holding that ‘causal explanation and storytelling 
convey fundamentally different modes of understanding’ (2009, pp. 
185–186), and thus that practical rationality is driven by the pursuit of 
two potentially competing drives towards distinct ways of making our 
lives intelligible to ourselves. Velleman is thus unable to appeal to nar-
rative self-understanding to allay worries about the intellectualist, or 
cognitively demanding character of his causal-psychological account of 
practical rationality. Is this a problem? That depends, I think, on our 
explanatory interests. Velleman’s chief concern is with the logical struc-
ture of mature human practical rationality. Maximizing one’s causal- 
psychological intelligibility to oneself is posited as the ideal at which 
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such practical rationality aims. The fact that this ideal is one that few 
people would consciously recognize as animating their behaviour, and 
is difficult or impossible to obtain, need not count against Velleman’s  
characterization. I, for example, could not tell you the statistical rules 
and regularities which govern optimal betting patterns in poker, and am 
confident that no game of poker I ever play will approximate those pat-
terns—but it might nonetheless be true that my poker playing activity 
qualifies as an attempt to play poker insofar as it attempts to track those 
rules and regularities, and can be assessed as going better or worse insofar 
as it succeeds or fails at this.
However, if our goal is to naturalistically explain the capacity for 
practical rationality as it is realized in and exercised by humans, we 
should be less sanguine about the idealizing and intellectualist features 
of Velleman’s view. Consider how we might attempt to put the previ-
ous section’s blueprints for building an agent into practice. Given cur-
rent cognitive-scientific knowledge, it’s plausible that we could indeed 
engineer systems with competing sets of motives, and even with the 
higher-order meta-motives to which Frankfurt appeals. But Velleman’s 
suggested addition of a global background motivation to act reasona-
bly that modulates the interactions of a system’s existing motives and 
behaviours is more mysterious—this is not a component that engineers 
of real or artificial systems have lying around in their workshops. As 
a piece of construction advice it is little more helpful than being told 
to add an immaterial soul, or a perpetual motion machine. We might 
thus agree that Velleman is right about the psychological structure that 
our completed agent will instantiate, while objecting that his account 
does nothing to help us with the naturalistic goal of understanding how 
agents can be constructed out of simple worldly materials.6 Velleman’s 
shift from describing his view of practical reason in terms of mature 
rational agents and idealized psychological theories to simple robots and 
6In the interests of simplicity I’m writing as if we can legitimately pull apart the explanatory pro-
jects of characterizing the constitutive structure of some phenomenon and spelling out how that 
phenomenon does or could arise in nature. But note that many will be inclined to resist this 
separation, holding that empirical inquiry and data are our best guides to metaphysical structure. 
Such folks should be especially sceptical of Velleman’s intellectualism about practical reason.
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viscerally understood stories looked like a promising step towards this 
naturalistic goal. But the admission that this shift represents a change 
in topic rather than a redescription shows that no progress has been 
made. If we care about understanding how agency emerges in the natu-
ral world then while Velleman might show us where our account must 
end up, he can’t tell us how to get there.
Intellectualist worries about Velleman’s view thus resurface once we 
sever the link (or come to believe that there was no link to be severed) 
between causal-psychological and narrative self-understanding. Severing 
this link also appears to undermine the claim that a drive towards narra-
tive self-understanding can make a constitutive contribution to agency. 
We saw in the last section that Velleman posits the drive towards causal- 
psychological self-understanding as the crucial ingredient of agency 
because he thinks it can be plausibly identified with the functional 
role of the agent—it is this drive that animates the activity of weigh-
ing up and selectively modifying the force of the motives vying for 
control of behaviour. And this activity can be plausibly understood as 
the essential form of agency. What would happen if this drive towards 
causal-psychological self-understanding were replaced with a drive 
towards narrative self-understanding? The latter drive is equally capable 
of adjudicating between, and modulating the influence of, competing 
motives on behaviour. The only apparent difference is that this adjudi-
cation and modulation is driven by standards of narrative, rather than 
causal-psychological coherence. Perhaps, then, we simply have two can-
didate occupants of the functional role of the agent instead of one—and 
this dual occupancy is what accounts for the fractured nature of prac-
tical rationality. But this is too quick. Consider why the drive towards 
causal-psychological self-understanding seemed like a plausible candi-
date for the role of the agent in the first place. Velleman clarifies:
Why would behaviour produced by such a mechanism be any more 
attributable to the person than that produced by other causes? The 
answer is that a person is somehow identified with his own rationality. 
As Aristotle put it, ‘Each person seems to be his understanding.’ Hence 
causation via a person’s rational faculties qualifies as causation by the per-
son himself. (2001b, p. 17)
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This quote reveals the rationalist intuitions at work in Velleman’s 
account of agency. The fact that adjudicating between, and modulat-
ing the motivational force of, competing determinants of behaviour is 
governed by rational standards is what makes it an intuitively plausi-
ble candidate to be cast in the role of the agent, qua rational intellect, 
thinks Velleman. In defence of this intuition we might note, as we did 
above, that an account of agency should explain the difference between 
behaviour governed by mere causal forces and behaviour guided by rea-
sons. Velleman’s account of agency straightforwardly accomplishes this 
by understanding the mechanisms that determine an agent’s behaviour 
in terms of rational standards applied by rational faculties. This link 
does not appear to obtain if we try to construe a drive towards narrative 
coherence as a motivating force of agency. After all, our initial charac-
terization of the distinction between narrative and causal-psychological 
coherence relied on stressing that a sequence of events can make nar-
rative sense—via establishing and completing an emotional cadence—
without being fully rationally intelligible. Think, for example, of the 
way in which myths and fantasies with supernatural elements, or nar-
ratives consisting of series of causally and spatiotemporally dislocated 
vignettes, can convey understanding. It thus appears on Velleman’s view 
that we have no reason to attribute behaviour stemming from the moti-
vational force of a drive towards narrative understanding to the agent 
qua rational intellect, or to view this behaviour as guided by reason in 
the way characteristic of agency. A drive towards narrative understand-
ing no longer looks like a plausible source of practical rationality.
Velleman (2009) appears to modify his earlier view of the relationship 
of narrative and causal-psychological intelligibility in ways that bear on 
these complications. At the end of §3 we saw Velleman (2007) claim that 
lacking a drive towards narrative self-understanding (as might be mani-
fested by managing one’s life like a stock portfolio) amounts to lacking 
a virtue of practical rationality. But Velleman (2009, p. 204) describes 
narrative self-understanding as a supplement to causal-psychological self- 
understanding that is ‘to some extent’ optional, citing self- descriptions 
such as Strawson’s (2004, 2017; §3, above) as evidence in favour of such 
a view. And he takes pains to emphasize that he now views narrative 
understanding as based on causal-psychological understanding:
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I assume that narrative intelligibility requires psychological intelligibility, 
but not vice versa. That is a story requires action, and action has to be 
intelligible as caused by the attitudes and attributes of a character, lest it 
count as no more than mere behavior. (2009, p. 185)
I will try to motivate an alternative conception of the relation between 
narrative and psychological intelligibility in the chapter’s final section, 
below. For now, note that these qualifications to Velleman’s view further 
undermine his claim that narrative intelligibility can function as a con-
stitutive motive of practical rationality. Velleman now views the drive 
towards causal-psychological self-intelligibility as sufficient for prac-
tical rationality, with a drive towards narrative self-intelligibility as an 
optional supplement. Now that Velleman insists that narrative intelligi-
bility presupposes psychological intelligibility, we can specify why there 
should be a link between behaviours motivated by a drive towards nar-
rative self-intelligibility and agency: the ability to make narrative sense 
to oneself presupposes the ability to make psychological sense to one-
self which Velleman identifies with the agent, qua rational intellect, and 
thereby qualifies as an exercise of practical rationality. But this is not 
because the drive towards narrative self-intelligibility is an independ-
ent source of practical rationality—it is because it is an optional way 
of manifesting the psychological drive with which Velleman originally 
identified the agent.
Here, then, is the situation. Velleman began with a plausible but 
demanding intellectualist account of the logical structure of practical 
rationality. He then added reference to a drive towards narrative intel-
ligibility to his account in a way that appeared to make it less intellec-
tualist, more naturalistically tractable, and better able to accommodate 
the apparent psychological diversity of ways in which we experience 
our activities as making sense to us. The cost of this was an apparent 
fracture in the structure of practical rationality. Upon the closer inspec-
tion we have given Velleman’s views in this section, however, all these 
appearances are illusory. Narrative intelligibility, according to the most 
recent incarnation of Velleman’s views, depends on the same capacities 
of the rational intellect he has always emphasized. Appealing to it thus 
moves us no closer to the goal of a naturalistically tractable account of 
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the constitution of agency. And when we act in ways that make more 
narrative than causal-psychological sense (as when we persist in the 
face of adversity) we are failing to properly realize our status as practi-
cal reasoners and thus as agents, since our actions fall short of the only 
standards that really matter for agency—those of causal- psychological 
consistency. The silver lining is that practical rationality no longer 
appears fractured—it has the same monolithic, intellectualist structure 
as in Velleman’s earlier work.
6  A Strange Inversion of Practical Reasoning
The appropriate response to these problems, I think, is to reverse the 
relations of dependence Velleman sees between capacities for rendering 
events intelligible in causal-psychological and narrative terms. Velleman 
(2009) argues that understanding a narrative presupposes the capacity 
to understand events in terms of the inferentially related psychological 
states that caused them:
Narrative understanding is not a substitute for causal-psychological 
self-understanding. The tale of Oedipus makes for a good story even if 
we don’t understand why the prophecy of Tiresias came true; but the 
tale would make no sense of any kind if we didn’t understand, from one 
scene to the next, why Oedipus was behaving as he did… Hence practi-
cal reasoning aimed at narrative self-understanding can supplement but 
not replace reasoning aimed at self-understanding in causal-psychological 
terms. (p. 203)
But this line of thinking undersells the scope of Velleman’s original 
account of narrative understanding. That account specified a possible 
way of understanding the relationship between any sequence of events, 
in terms of the way in which its constituents hang together according 
to a familiar emotional cadence. Velleman rightly notes above that, in 
some cases, we must exercise relatively sophisticated folk- psychological 
capacities in order to grasp the events we aim to make intelligible before 
we can perceive any emotional cadence that unites them. Fully grasping 
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the emotional beats of a complex espionage thriller or Shakespearean 
farce requires some prior understanding of the psychological states of 
the characters and the ways in which they are revealed or hidden by 
their activities. But relations between non-psychological states can also 
be grasped according to their place in a familiar emotional cadence. 
The very locution of ‘cadence’ draws attention to the fact that we can 
exercise narrative understanding in experiencing the affective structure 
of non-psychological states or events such as a series of musical notes. 
In such a case we, the subjects of understanding, are ushered through 
a series of affective psychological states that determine our perspective 
on the object of understanding—but this process need not involve 
imputing psychological states to ourselves, the object of understanding, 
or an author behind it. Even when the object of our narrative under-
standing is ourselves or other agents, some behaviour can be rendered 
intelligible via its fit with an emotional cadence without deploying the 
sophisticated folk-psychological capacities emphasized by Velleman. 
Think of an infant learning to enjoy the activity of peek-a-boo, or sim-
ple turn-taking games. Children who are too young to reliably parse 
sequences of behaviour into intentional actions, or to manifest sen-
sitivity to the potential divergence between behaviours and their psy-
chological causes, can nonetheless come to grasp ritualized play events 
and the expressive behaviours they involve in terms of their place in a 
familiar emotional cadence. This kind of understanding is manifested 
by the way in which infants anticipate the next stage in the play, and 
their reactions when such anticipations are confirmed or frustrated. To 
understand events in this way is not yet to understand a narrative, or 
the psychological states of any of the parties involved—but it nonethe-
less requires exercising the mode of understanding relations between 
events which Velleman argues we employ when grasping the events in 
a narrative. The positive suggestion with which I close this chapter is 
that such exercises of the capacity for narrative understanding, when 
suitably enculturated and scaffolded, form the bedrock for the mature 
folk-psychological capacities which Velleman makes central to practical 
rationality.
Luckily, this is not a case I need to make from scratch. The past 
20 years or so have seen a host of important work that aims to question 
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nativist, modular and cognitivist accounts of capacities for folk- 
psychological understanding by emphasizing the role of embodied, emo-
tional and situational factors, and by drawing attention to various social 
scaffolds and dynamics that support and constrain our understanding of 
ourselves and others (e.g. Hurley 1998; McGeer 1996, 2007; Mameli 
2001; Sterelny 2003, 2012; Zawidzki 2008, 2013). A key strand of that 
literature argues that our folk-psychological apparatus for interpreting 
behaviour serves not only descriptive and explanatory purposes, but also 
plays a regulative role. This kind of regulation is at work when Gilbert’s 
avowal that he plans to go to the closet, or my avowal that I intend to go 
for a run this evening, shape our subsequent deliberation. Our respec-
tive bits of self-directed folk-psychology function not only as descrip-
tions, but as motivations to conform to those descriptions in our future 
behaviour. The same regulative pressure is at work, these theorists argue, 
when I interpret others or when they interpret me—a community of 
sociable, eager-to-please, but quick-to-censure intentional agents will 
give rise to an emergent pressure to make one’s own activities and those 
of one’s peers conform to shared standards of intelligibility. To see why, 
and the role that narrative understanding might play here, let’s return to 
our attempt to specify a blueprint for building an agent.
Suppose once again that we begin with a creature that is a bundle of 
competing drives and motivations. Add the capacity for that creature to 
occupy emotional states, understood as valenced bodily states that pref-
erentially direct attention to specific aspects of the creature’s situation. 
Now add the capacity for those states to link together in recognizable 
sequences or cadences which the creature can grasp via anticipation or 
retrospection (the kind of primitive capacity for narrative understanding 
which I suggested above may be at work when young children grasp the 
structure of events in simple play activities). Suppose also that the range 
of emotional cadences via which we can understand events is develop-
mentally plastic—while the emotional cadences that structure under-
standing of some kinds of events (such as those involved in a game of 
peek-a-boo) might be innate, exposure to the right events and associ-
ated bodily states can inculcate a grasp of new cadences. The emotional 
beats that structure our understanding of complex murder mysteries or 
espionage thrillers, for example, are unlikely to be innately understood. 
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But a subject with a developmental trajectory that includes repeated 
exposure to the right books or films can come to anticipate or retrospect 
the relationships between events in such plots as unthinkingly as a child 
anticipates the next event in a game of peek-a-boo. Two final supposi-
tions about our creature—first, it has an innate appetite for intelligibil-
ity, and distaste for unintelligibility. In this context, this simply means 
that our creature likes it when events fit familiar emotional cadences—
it’s usually happier when its anticipations pan out, or when its retro-
spection fits recent events into a familiar emotional structure (babies, 
for example, prefer it when games of peek-a-boo follow established pro-
tocol). Second, our creatures are sociable—they like to please, don’t like 
to displease, and are sensitive to indications of pleasure or displeasure 
from their fellow creatures. Such a creature will be driven to understand 
its world via the emotional cadences with which it is familiar, and will 
acquire familiarity with new emotional cadences via repeated exposure 
over the course of its development.
Now, suppose further that we scaffold our creature’s development 
in a particular way—we surround it with other sociable creatures who 
likewise crave intelligibility and approval, and who exhibit patterns of 
behaviour that is intelligible in folk-psychological ways. Suppose also 
that our creature’s developmental trajectory involves regular interac-
tion with caregivers who repeatedly expose it to affectively engaging 
narratives conveying stereotypical folk-psychological wisdom via the 
emotional beats of their story structures (Sterelny 2003, 2012; Hutto 
2008). When our creature’s development is scaffolded in this way, it 
will acquire a drive to make its own behaviour intelligible in terms of 
whatever emotional cadences structure the understanding of its fellow 
creatures. Perceptible regularities in the behaviours of its fellow crea-
tures will eventually be narratively understood in terms of the reliably 
similar structured patterns of embodied affective reactions—emotional 
cadences—they produce for our creature. A helping hand in learning 
the most important of such cadences is provided by the creature’s car-
egivers, who supply a regular and easily digestible diet of tried-and-tested 
narratives and interactive practices that highlight patterns which are 
particularly important for understanding and predicting behaviour 
in their community. Crucially, because our creatures are sociable and 
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intelligibility-craving, they will acquire a drive to render themselves 
intelligible in terms of the structure and patterns that characterize their 
understanding of their peers. They themselves are objects whose behav-
iour their peers are attempting to understand; as intelligibility-craving 
creatures, their peers will be happier when the creature behaves intel-
ligibly by their lights; as a sociable creature, our creature has a drive 
to make its peers happy, and will thus acquire a motivation to behave 
intelligibly by the lights of their peers. For the kinds of creatures we 
have described, intersubjective understanding thus acquires a regulative 
as well as a predictive role (McGeer, Mameli, op. cit.). Given this, crea-
tures with the features and social scaffolding described above will even-
tually acquire a drive to act in ways that conform to whatever standards 
of intelligibility are prevalent in their community.7
This is how a drive towards folk-psychological intelligibility could 
be built out of a suitably scaffolded drive towards narrative intelligibil-
ity. We have reversed the relations of dependence that Velleman (2009) 
argues obtain between these drives. In doing so, we have resolved the 
problems I raised for his account in §4. While the blueprint for crea-
ture-design just presented is more complex than the Vellemanian blue-
print of §3, it is also more naturalistically tractable—it is easier to see 
how we could realize that blueprint with cognitive structures and pro-
cesses whose operations we broadly understand. Where Velleman speaks 
of bolting a drive to act reasonably on to a bundle of competing moti-
vations, I have suggested how such a drive could gradually emerge from 
a suitably scaffolded, developmentally plastic, motivated creature that 
can make sense of events via emotional cadences. While defending the 
7One question that a fully developed version of the present proposal should address concerns the 
origins of the practices of intersubjective understanding that scaffold development. Given the 
design specifications above, a suitably developmentally plastic creature will acquire a drive to act 
intelligibly by the standards of whatever practices of intersubjective understanding are present in 
its community—hence sophisticated folk-psychological understanding can emerge from primi-
tive narrative understanding. But how do sophisticated practices of intersubjective understanding 
come to exist in the scaffolding environment in the first place? A naturalistic story here must 
show how folk-psychological practices like our own can bootstrap themselves into existence from 
humbler beginnings given the existence of a community of creatures with the psychological struc-
ture described above. Sterelny (2003, 2012) and Zawidzki (2013) in particular have provided 
plausible, empirically informed suggestions about how such bootstrapping could occur.
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empirical credentials of this picture is a task for another time, I think 
the prospects are good. In addition to the work by proponents of the 
regulative dimension of folk-psychology cited above, work on embod-
ied resonance and interpersonal coordination (as suggested by e.g. 
Hurley 2008) and constructionist approaches to emotion (e.g. Barrett 
2017) yields many suggestions about how we humans might instanti-
ate the blueprint sketched in this section. Viewing the drive towards 
folk-psychological intelligibility as a culturally scaffolded drive towards 
narrative intelligibility helps restore the credentials of the latter drive 
as a legitimate source of practical rationality. On Velleman’s (2009) 
view, the drive towards narrative intelligibility can qualify as a source 
of practical rationality only because it is an optional way of manifest-
ing a drive towards causal-psychological intelligibility. But the blueprint 
above shows how we can agree with the rationalist intuitions motivat-
ing Velleman’s account of practical rationality (whereby the drive to act 
reasonably is plausibly identified with the agent because there is a privi-
leged link between personhood and rational faculties) while still holding 
that the drive toward narrative intelligibility is essential to agency. This 
is because the latter drive makes an essential contribution to the motive 
force of the drive to act reasonably—creatures that meet the design 
specifications above acquire a motive to act reasonably only because 
their drive towards narrative understanding takes on a particular, cul-
turally inculcated form whereby their sociable and intelligibility-craving 
nature motivates them to self-regulate their behaviour according to 
whatever folk-psychological principles structure the intersubjective 
understanding of their peers. More tentatively, the blueprint above 
might suggest how particular instances of a drive towards narrative 
intelligibility can qualify as a source of practical rationality in its own 
right. On certain permissive social practice accounts of reasons (e.g. 
Rorty 1979, 1999), a good reason is simply one that most of our peers 
are happy to accept. Such views would allow the norms of practical 
rationality to be fixed by the practices of intersubjective understanding 
that a given community actually employs, even when those standards 
fall short of strict standards of calculative rationality. As we saw above 
(§2), an appealing feature of a narrative conception of practical ration-
ality is that it makes sense of the appearance that we do indeed make 
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sense of our own activity and that of others in diverse ways—persisting 
in the face of adversity can appear a reasonable course of action to us 
even when it is likely to fail to maximize the satisfaction of an agent’s 
projects and preferences. If the norms of practical rationality are fixed 
via reference to actual practices of intersubjective understanding then 
the blueprint above suggests how any such norms can acquire motive 
force for a suitable enculturated creature, regardless of how closely they 
align with the norm of maximizing causal-psychological intelligibility.
I have argued, then, that we can save the best features of Velleman’s 
view of practical rationality by inverting it—rather than founding the 
capacity for narrative understanding on sophisticated capacities for 
causal-psychological understanding of ourselves and our peers, I have 
sketched how the latter capacities might be built out of socially scaf-
folded capacities for narrative understanding, and how such scaffold-
ing can imbue the principles that govern the frameworks we use to 
make sense of each other with the motive force that Velleman argues 
is constitutive of practical rationality. On this picture, practical ration-
ality is essential to agency, narrative understanding is essential to prac-
tical rationality, and the regular cadences that pattern the ebb and flow 
of our emotional lives are essential to narrative understanding. It is in 
virtue of narrative cadences that move us emotionally that we can be 
moved agentially. That’s my story, and I’m sticking to it.
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